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Abstract 
This study assesses the impact of income and asset poverty on child work using the rural sub-
sample of the 2004 Malawi Integrated Household Survey. Instrumenting consumption 
expenditure with a location dummy variable and interacting consumption expenditure with 
household land-holding size in probit models, the likelihood of child labour is found to relate 
negatively with household consumption. On the other hand child labour relates positively 
with household land-holding size for consumption poor households only and when labour 
markets are imperfect. These findings do not discourage asset accumulation policies as a 
remedy against child labour but support policies that aim at increasing returns on the assets.  
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1 Introduction  
In 2004, about 218 million children worldwide were estimated to be part of the labour force 
(ILO, 2006). Most of these working children, labelled “child labourers”, help their families at 
home, on family farms or in family businesses (Edmonds, 2008). In Malawi alone, the 2002 
Malawi Child Labour Survey estimated that 1.5 million children aged between 5 and 17 years 
old were in usual economic activities while 1.7 million were in usual non-economic activities, 
representing 38.8 percent, 44.5 percent, respectively (Malawi Government and ILO, 2004). 
This reflects a high prevalence of the child labour both in Malawi and in other poor countries. 
This problem has been in existence in poor communities for a long time and has led to a series 
of theoretical and policy oriented research geared towards supporting interventions aimed at 
eliminating child labour. 
 
Over the years, child labour research has focused on finding the determinants of child labour 
supply, with emphasis on the role of poverty, fertility and liquidity constraints (Bellettini et 
al., 2005). Among the determinants that have been studied so far, poverty has emerged as the 
major one and a positive relationship is generally expected. According to Edmonds (2008), 
there are many reasons that can theoretically explain the negative connection between family 
incomes (positive connection between poverty) and child labour. Edmonds (2008) identifies 
the following three explanations. First, child labour may be “bad” in parental preferences so 
that as incomes improve, the family chooses to have children work less. Second, with 
diminishing marginal utility of income, the value of the marginal contribution of the child’s 
income decreases as family incomes increase. Third, higher family incomes may facilitate the 
purchase of substitutes for child labour that lower the return to child labour within the 
household. Although the positive relationship between child labour and poverty has been well 
explained theoretically (Basu and Van, 1998; Baland and Robinson, 2000; Bellettini et al., 
2005), empirical research has not been conclusive (Edmonds, 2008). Positive relationships 
between poverty and child labour have been established in some cases (Canagarajah and 
Coulombe, 1997; Sasaki and Temesgen, 1999; Blunch and Verner, 2000;  Okupkpara and 
Odurukwe, 2006) and rejected in other cases (Ray, 2000). Some studies have not established 
any relationship (Nielsen, 1998; Sasaki and Temesgen, 1999). Most intriguing is the finding 
that household wealth increases child labour (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Beegle et al., 2006; 
Dumas, 2007). This finding casts doubt on a well established fact that child labour emerges as 
a result of household poverty (Basu et al., forthcoming). 
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The conflicting research findings on the relationship between child labour and poverty may be 
due to a number of differences in these studies such as definitional differences, 
methodological differences and spatial differences. Different results can be obtained when 
child labour is defined differently in different studies (see World Bank, 2005). Different 
definitions of child labour relates to types of work that are considered as child work, the 
amount of time a child is involved in an activity and the definition of the child. Even when the 
definitions of child work have been standardized, different results can still be obtained if 
different methodologies have been used. For example, Basu et al. (forthcoming) argue that 
lack of explicit modelling of labour markets in developing countries in child labour models 
can result in misleading results such as the positive relationship between household wealth 
and child labour. In addition, there is a cultural component associated with child work 
decisions; this means that the significance of poverty in explaining child work decisions in 
different countries and/or cultural settings will differ. This indicates the need for country-
specific child labour studies and also studies that broaden the definition of child labour. 
 
Using data from rural children from Malawi aged between 5 and 14 years old, this study 
explored the relationship between child labour and household poverty. Specifically, the study 
aimed to show that income poverty relates positively with child labour but the effect of 
household wealth on child labour depends on household consumption level when labour 
markets are imperfect.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a review of the literature, 
Section 3 presents the methodology and Section 4 describes the data, defines the variables and 
presents descriptive statistics. Empirical results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
  
2 Literature review 
Child labour literature looks at a diversity of theoretical and empirical issues as they relate to 
child labour. Although, some work had been done on child labour before the 1999 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Worst Form of Child Labour Convention, most of 
the research activities have been conducted after the convention. For example, Edmonds 
(2008), in an economic literature search, found that there were a total of six peer reviewed 
journal articles on child labour between 1980 and 1990. Between 1990 and 2000, there were 
65 peer reviewed papers, and 143 articles in the first 5 years of this decade. An example of 
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child labour research that was done before the 1999 ILO international convention, is the 
economic model of child labour by Basu and Van (1998). This work is considered by many 
researchers (see, for example, Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999; Bellettini, et al., 2005; 
Edmonds, 2008) as groundbreaking in theoretical investigations of the determinants of child 
labour. The model characterizes a developing economy that exhibits multiple equilibria, with 
children working in at least one. Two axioms about micro-level behaviour of households and 
firms for sending children to work are presented in this model. The first axiom is the luxury 
axiom which states that a family sends its children to the labour market only if its income 
from sources other than child labour is very low. The second is called the substitution axiom 
that states that from the point of view of firms, child labour is substitutable for adult labour. 
Extending the Basu-Van model, Swinnerton and Rogers (1999) add the third axiom which 
they called the distribution axiom which states that income or wealth from non-labour sources 
must be sufficiently concentrated in the hands of a few agents if child labour is to exist. If 
non-labour income is distributed with sufficient equality this axiom states that market 
equilibrium with child labour cannot exist in the Basu-Van model.  
 
Related to the substitution axiom, Bellettini et al. (2005) analysed determinants of a firm’s 
demand on unskilled labour (which includes child labour) versus skilled labour and its 
interaction with education choices of households. Their results are that child labour occurs 
due to firms’ reluctance to innovate or households’ unwillingness to educate or both. The 
argument on firms’ reluctance to innovate agrees with earlier observations that the supply of 
labour by children and women is critical for the early stages of industrialization because they 
are both cheap and suited for affine tasks that require small fingers (see Edmonds, 2008). 
While agreeing with the assertion that technological backwardness of firms leads to 
employment of child labour as a source of cheap unskilled labour, this study questioned the 
conclusion on household unwillingness to educate their children. We questioned the notion 
that households (parents) can be unwilling to educate their children because this conflicts with 
the parents’ altruism which is a well grounded assumption in child labour literature. We think 
that parents are aware of the importance of child education and the negative effects of child 
labour and that they send their children to work for survival of their families and their 
children (Wahba, 2001). The altruism assumption agrees with earlier microeconomic models 
of fertility most of which show that, ceteris paribus, parents wish to maximize the welfare of 
their children (see Montgomery and Tussell, 1986; Wong, 1987; Becker, 1991). The welfare 
of the children enters the utility function of their parents and the household as a whole. These 
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economic theorists have referred to welfare of the children as child quality and this is usually 
assumed to be a function of the time and money lavished on children (Montgomery and 
Tussell, 1986). Parents obtain utility from the status of their children now and in the future. 
However, these are constrained by the available resources in the family. Much as the good 
welfare of the child produces utility to the parent, “poor welfare” produces disutility. 
 
A more recent model of child labour has been developed by Basu et al. (forthcoming), which 
not only looks at income poverty but also at asset poverty as causes of child labour. This 
model explains the positive relationship between child labour and household wealth such as 
land-holding size that has been found in some empirical studies. The model shows that an 
increase in household wealth increases child labour when the labour market is imperfect such 
that increase in land for income poor households provides working opportunities for children. 
 
Empirically, there have been a number of studies on the relationship between child labour and 
poverty. In general, researchers who compare poor households to rich households at a single 
point in time in a country find mixed evidence of a link between poverty and child labour 
(Edmonds, 2008). Some studies support the notion that there is a positive significant 
relationship between household poverty and child labour while others fail to confirm this 
relationship. For example, Blunch and Verner (2000) and Okupkpara and Odurukwe (2006) 
found that a positive relationship between poverty and child labour exists in Ghana and 
Nigeria respectively. This relationship was also found in Pakistan by Ray (2000) who studied 
the likelihood of households earning below poverty line to send their children to work. 
However, Ray (2000) failed to confirm the same relationship in Peru. This author’s results in 
Peru are similar to those of Nielsen (1998) in Zambia. However, Canagarajah and Coulombe 
(1997) find a weak relationship between child labour and poverty in Ghana, while Sasaki and 
Temesgen (1999) report no significant relationship between household income per capita and 
work decisions in Peru. Studies that include household wealth mainly in the form of land-
holding size have found a positive relationship between child labour and poverty (Bhalotra 
and Heady, 2003; Beegle et al., 2006; Dumas, 2007). 
 
Further to the assertion that poverty leads to child labour, Wahba (2001) looked at the impact 
of child labour on poverty transmission and found that having a parent who had been a child 
labourer increases the probability of a child working. However, having a parent who worked 
as a child labourer does not affect significantly the likelihood of a child going to school. 
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Related to this is the work by Emerson and Souza (2003, 2007). In their earlier work, the 
authors developed a dynamic intergenerational model of child labour which they used to test 
the persistence of child labour. The model predicts that children are more likely to work when 
they come from households with parents who were child labourers, from households with 
parents who have lower educational attainment and that child labour has adverse effects on 
children’s educational attainment and their adult earnings. The empirical application of their 
model to Brazil and their later work confirmed that higher parental education decreases the 
likelihood of a child entering the labour market.  
 
3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
This study followed Basu et al. (forthcoming) to model the relationship between household 
poverty and child work decisions. Unlike earlier economic models of child labour (Basu and 
Van, 1998; Baland and Robinson, 2000) that only consider income/consumption poverty, this 
framework considered both income and asset poverty and explained the strange positive 
relationship between household wealth and child work as has been empirically found in some 
studies (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Dumas, 2007). The model supposes that we have a one-
adult household whose labour supply is assumed to be inelastic. It is also assumed that if the 
household income from non-child work sources rises sufficiently high, the household would 
on its own accord withdraw the children from the work which is normally referred to as the 
“luxury axiom” in child labour literature. The household is assumed to have a utility function 
of the form: 
 
),( Hxuu =             (1) 
where x is the total consumption of the household and H is child work decisions which takes 
the value 0 when the child does not work and 1 when the child is working. A simple 
specification of the utility function is considered to account for the luxury axiom into 
Equation 1. 
 
Hcxu .)( −= φ           (2) 
where 0)(' >xφ and 0)('' <xφ , for all x and c is a positive real number. Assuming the 
absence of a labour market—an extreme case of labour market imperfection—each household 
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will have to fend for itself.1 If the household owns k units of land, its production function, f, is 
given by: 
 
)1,( += Hkfq           (3) 
where q is the output produced, 1+H  is the amount of labour used – H from the children and 
1 from the adult. We assume that 0,;0, <> HHkkHk ffff  and 0>kHf . Since there is no 
labour market in the economy, the household consumes what it produces, so that qx = . 
Substituting the household output into the household utility function, Equation 2, the 
optimization problem becomes: 
 
HcHkf
H
.))1,((max −+φ          (4) 
 
The first order condition is given as: 
 
cf Hx =.φ            (5) 
 
Taking total differentials with respect to k and H and re-arranging terms we get: 
 
HHxxxH
HkxxxkH
ff
fff
dk
dH
φφ
φφ
+
+
−= 2          (6) 
 
Equation 6 shows the impact of land-holding size on child labour. Since 0, <HHxx fφ  
and 0, >xHf φ , the denominator of the equation is always negative implying that the sign of 
dk
dH
 is determined by the enumerator. It can also be shown that the first term of the 
enumerator is negative while the second term is positive. This means that the relative sizes of 
these terms determine the sign of Equation 6. When the first term of the enumerator is large 
relative to the second term, Equation 6 will have a negative sign. Large values of the first term 
can be achieved when either or both of kf  and Hf  are large. According to production theory 
and empirical studies (see Sen, 1962; Deolalikar, 1981) small farms are expected to have 
higher land productivity but lower labour productivity, i.e., a large kf  and a small Hf . This 
                                               
1
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makes it difficult to theoretically determine the effect of an increase in land-holding size on 
the first term because land productivity and labour productivity are going in different 
directions as a result of a change in farm size. Since production and consumption activities are 
closely linked in this model, and we expect lower total output for households with small 
farms, consumer theory would suggest that households with small farms will also have high 
marginal utility of output xφ  which increases the second term and overall positive effects of 
land on child labour. We therefore expect a positive relationship between child work and 
land-holding size among the income poor and a negative relationship among the income non-
poor. 
 
3.2 Model specification 
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to show that household consumption is 
negatively related to child work and that the effect of land-holding size depends on the level 
of consumption. To do this, we included per capita consumption expenditure, per capita 
land-holding size and their interaction term in the child work equation. The specification for 
testing our hypothesis is given as: 
 
iiiiiii vZlandPCElandPCEH +++++= δββββ )*(3210      (7) 
 
For child i, iH  is a child work measure; iPCE  is the household per capita consumption 
expenditure; iland  is the per capita land-holding size; and Zi is a vector of child, household 
and community control variables. The parameter 1β  captures the effect of per capita 
consumption expenditure on child work hours when per capita land-holding size is equal to 
zero. Similarly 2β  measures the effect of land-holding size on child work hours when per 
capita consumption expenditure is equal to zero. However, 1β  and 2β  are supposed to be 
interpreted together with 3β (see Wooldridge, 2002; Brambor et al., 2006). The 
interpretation of the parameter estimate on the interaction term is almost similar to the 
interpretation of quadratic terms which are simply interaction terms of the variable with 
itself. If  we obtain the following results on the following pair of parameters 02 >β  
and 03 <β , we will interpret it as an increase in per capita land-holding size increases child 
work when per capita consumption is equal to zero and that the increasing effect reduces 
when consumption expenditure increases from zero.  
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One of the major empirical challenges we faced was how to model the dependent variable. 
The outcome variable, child work hours, has many observations where zero hours are reported 
and this has to be taken care of since ordinary least squares (OLS) regression will produce 
biased and inconsistent estimates. Standard Tobit models (Tobin, 1958) have been used to 
estimate models with such data in many previous studies. However, there is growing literature 
that disputes the adequacy of Tobit models in handling such data because the Tobit model 
considers all zero values as corner solution outcomes. Some of the zeros in child work data 
are true corner solutions such that those children will never work. Other zeros have a positive 
probability of working, but the children do not work because of other factors such as 
unavailability of working opportunities. This makes sense when the labour market conditions 
are imperfect. The double-hurdle model proposed by (Cragg, 1971) and used in many other 
studies (Yen and Jones, 1996; Moffatt, 2005; Aristei and Pieroni, 2009) provides a solution to 
such data problems. The double-hurdle model allows for a separate stochastic process that 
describes the individual decision to participate and the level of participation. The first hurdle 
equation (participation decision) in this study is specified as: 
 


 >
=
+=
otherwise
Hif
d
Nuuzd
i
iiii
0
01
)1,0(~* α
      (8) 
 
where *id  is a latent variable that takes the value 1 if the child reports a positive value of 
child work hours iH   and zero otherwise; iz is a vector of regressors; and α  is a vector of 
parameters. The second hurdle equation (level of participation decision) is given as: 
 


 >
=
+=
otherwise
HifH
H
NvvxH
ii
i
iiii
0
0
),0(~
**
2* σβ
      (9) 
 
where ix  is a vector of regressors and β  is a vector of parameters. The error terms are 
assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution.  
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Without determining the correct specification for our data, we statistically compared the 
Tobit and double-hurdle specifications using the likelihood ratio test.  
 
An additional estimation challenge was the endogeneity of consumption expenditure which 
may have been due to self consumption and also because part of the household income 
comes from child work. The endogeneity problem may also be caused by the fact that poor 
households differ from rich households in many ways that might be associated with child 
labour (Edmonds, 2008). There are two approaches researchers commonly use to handle this 
problem in child labour studies. First, some studies address part of the problem by relating 
child labour to variation in income that excludes the child’s income (Ray, 2000; Duryea and 
Arends-Kuenning, 2003). While this technique addresses the mechanical source of 
endogeneity, it does not deal with the joint nature of child time allocation and family living 
standards (Edmonds, 2008). In addition, this is only possible when we are considering child 
work that is remunerated. In cases where child work includes non-remunerated work such as 
household domestic chores or work in family enterprises, this approach is not appropriate 
since it will not value the indirect income the child is contributing to household income by 
freeing adults’ time for other remunerated activities. An appropriate procedure is to use the 
instrumental variables estimation technique which aims to handle the broader endogeneity 
problem (see Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Ersado, 2005). Since we expect per capita 
consumption expenditure to be endogenous, the interaction term between per capita 
consumption and land will also be endogenous. In this case, the interaction between land-
holding size and the identified instrument will be a valid instrument for the interaction term 
(Wooldridge, 2002). We corrected for endogeneity by using a procedure that was proposed 
by Smith and Blundell (1986) and elaborated by Wooldridge (2002) for a case of 
endogeneity of an interaction term. In this procedure, the suspected endogenous variable (per 
capita consumption expenditure) is regressed on all the exogenous variables and 
instrumental variables (instrument for consumption expenditure and for the interaction term) 
using OLS and the residual terms from these equations are included in the main equation we 
are estimating. Significance of the parameter estimates on the residual term in the main 
equation confirms and corrects endogeneity. A dummy variable that divided the districts into 
two groups according to their mean consumption levels was used as an instrument for 
consumption expenditure. At first the mean consumption expenditure for all the districts was 
ranked and the poorest 50% of the districts were assigned a 1 and 0 otherwise. This 
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instrument managed to identify households in districts whose consumption expenditure is 
similar but their child labour allocations may be different due to different local situations. 
The instrument was statistically tested in the consumption and child work regressions. It was 
found to be a good instrument that was significantly related to consumption expenditure but 
not to child work thereby meeting the exclusion requirements. 
 
4 Data and variables description 
The estimated models included variables that were used to control for child characteristics, 
household characteristics and community characteristics. Child age and its square, sex of the 
child and relationship of the child to the household head (whether the child is a biological 
child or not) were used to control for child characteristics. Number of male and female adult 
(more than 14 years old) members, number of children aged under five, age of the household 
head, age of the mother and sex of the household head were used to control for household 
demographic characteristics that also reflects the intra-household labour supply situation. In 
addition, dummy variables for the highest educational attainment for the household head (no 
education and primary education) were also used to control for household level 
characteristics. Community level characteristics were controlled for by the inclusion of 
dummy variables of two of the three major administrative/political regions (Central and 
North), distance to the nearest primary school, and number of school days in the previous two 
weeks. Number of school days in the previous two weeks was used to control for schooling 
time which competes with child work for the child’s time. Since some of the activities carried 
out by the children are seasonal, and households were interviewed at different times of the 
year, we included a dummy variable that controlled for seasonality of the activities which 
took the value 1 if the household was interviewed during the rainy season, and 0 otherwise.  
 
The data used were from the 2004 Malawi Integrated Household Survey that was collected by 
the Malawi National Statistical Office (NSO) from March 2004 to April 2005. The survey 
collected information from a nationally representative sample of 11,280 households; it was 
designed to cover a wide array of subject matter, with the primary objective of providing a 
complete and integrated data set to better understand the socioeconomic status of the 
population in Malawi (MEPD, NSO and World Bank, 2005). This study used the module on 
time use and labour of the household questionnaire to generate dependent variables. 
Household members were asked the question: “How many hours in the last seven days did 
you do (insert name of activity?)”. Recalls for domestic activities were for the previous 24 
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hours because these are normally done on a daily basis and a 24-hour recall would give a 
more precise estimate. Children who were employed as house servants in the interviewed 
households were excluded from the sample because the poverty of the households where they 
came from, which was not captured in the study, was more important for them. This resulted 
in a sample of 7,108 rural children between 5 and 14 years old. The descriptive statistics for 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 1.  
 
[INSERT TABLE1 HERE] 
 
 
The mean per capita consumption expenditure of 15,253 Malawi Kwacha (MWK) showed 
that most of the households in the sample had their consumption expenditure below the 
poverty line of MWK16,165 set by the Malawi Government. The mean per capita land-
holding size of 0.48ha showed the existence of land pressure in the sample. The descriptive 
statistics also showed that 50% of the children were girls; the average age of children in the 
sample was 9.17 years. About 76% of these children were the household head’s own and the 
remainder were other relations. Up to 52% of the household heads had no formal education, 
while 8% had attained secondary education as their highest level of education.  
 
The dependent variable is defined and described in Table 2. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 
Although we did not run econometric models for child work in domestic activities, we still 
gave descriptive statistics for it. It is shown that about 54% of children in this age group 
worked in at least one activity and, on average, the children worked for 7.89 hours a week. 
Most of the children (43%) were reported to have performed domestic chores which included 
cleaning the house, fetching water, fetching firewood and cooking. The average weekly hours 
worked for this activity was 4.80. There was low participation in market work which included 
child work in remunerated activities and in family businesses. 
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5 Empirical results 
 
The empirical estimation began with the selection of the appropriate model. We first 
compared the Tobit specification with the double-hurdle specification using the likelihood 
ratio test. Since the log likelihood for Tobit model ( TLlog ) is the sum of the log likelihoods 
of the truncated regression model ( TRLlog ) and probit model ( PLlog ), the likelihood ratio 
(LR) statistic can be computed as: 
 
[ ])log(loglog2 TRPT LLLLR +−−=       (10) 
 
Which is χ2~distributed with TRPT Kkk ++  degrees of freedom (see Martínez-Espiňeira, 
2006). The results of the model selection test are presented in Table 3.  
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
 
The likelihood statistic of 400.02 is greater than the critical chi-square statistic of 95.62 which 
suggests that the double-hurdle model fits the data better than the Tobit model. An assessment 
of the coefficients and their significance levels also showed some differences in the double-
hurdle model and the Tobit model. However, the results showed that consumption 
expenditure and land-holding size were insignificant in explaining child work hours. These 
were significant in the Tobit model which has been found to be less suitable than the double-
hurdle model. This makes both the double-hurdle model and the Tobit model useless in our 
study since the second stage of the double-hurdle model has little value addition to our 
hypothesis. We therefore chose the probit model which was estimated by using the ivprobit 
command in stata to obtain reliable standard errors. We also modelled the disaggregated child 
work equations in the same fashion. The results of the parameter estimates and the marginal 
effects obtained from the instrumental variable probit model are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
 16
 
The Wald statistic indicates that the model is significant. Apart from the variables of interest 
in this study, there are also interesting results on other variables which we discuss before we 
discuss the core variables. The results confirmed the presence of gender bias in child labour 
where boys were found to have a lower probability of working than girls, on aggregate. It was 
also found that the probability that a child will work increases with the increase in child age at 
a decreasing rate. In addition, the number of school days in the previous two weeks was found 
to significantly reduce the probability that a child would work. This showed that parents care 
about the education of their children.  
 
We found that consumption expenditure was insignificant in determining the probability that 
a child would work in at least in one activity when land-holding size was equal to zero. 
However, land-holding size was found to positively influence the probability that the child 
would work in at least in one activity when consumption expenditure as equal to zero. 
However, this positive effect of land decreased when consumption expenditure increased. 
This means that at a certain high level of consumption expenditure, increase in land would no 
longer have a positive effect on the probability that a child would work. Solving the following 
derivative for consumption level (PCE) at which the effect of land becomes zero, will give us 
a point at which the effect of land on the probability that a child will work changes signs:  
 
0*)(
)0(
32 =−=∂
>∂ PCE
land
HP
ϖϖ         (11) 
 
where ω2 and ω3 are marginal effects of land and the interaction term respectively. The 
solution to this derivative is MWK17,462.20 which implies that this is a consumption 
threshold above which an increase in landholding size does not increase the probability that a 
child will work. Below this threshold, an increase in land increases the probability that the 
child will work. To statistically test this result, we re-estimated the probit model for the two 
sub-samples.  
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
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Since we have disaggregated the households with respect to consumption levels as they 
related to the consumption threshold level, the interaction variable in this estimation was 
dropped. The results showed that, on average, a unit increase in land-holding size increased 
probability that a child would work by 10% among low consumption households. However, 
this increase in land-holding size does not influence the probability that children would work 
in at least one activity among the high consumption households. The results also showed that 
consumption expenditure has a negative significant effect on the probability that a child 
would work in at least one activity among the high consumption households and the same was 
not significant among the low consumption level households. These results support the 
hypothesis that the positive effect of household land-holding size on child work is mainly 
among the income/consumption poor and when labour markets are absent. 
 
We estimated similar models for child work in household non-market production activities 
and market activities to show the differential effects of land-holding size and consumption 
level on child work to check if these effects were different in different activities. The results 
of are presented in Table 6. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
 
As expected land-holding size was found to positively influence the probability that children 
would work in non-market household production activities, which are predominantly 
agricultural in rural Malawi, when household consumption was equal to zero but the positive 
effect declined when consumption level increased. Consumption level itself was not 
significant in explaining the probability that children would work in non-market activities 
when land-holding size was equal to zero. However, consumption level was found to 
significantly and negatively influence the probability that children would work in market 
activities when land-holding size was equal to zero.  
 
Although consumption level has been interacted with land-holding size, the results in all 
estimated models suggested that the effect of consumption level on the probability that 
children would work was independent of the amount of land the household possessed since in 
models where consumption level only was significant the interaction term was not significant. 
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The Wald test for joint significance in this case may be misleading because the results 
depended heavily on the level of significance of the significant variable (consumption 
expenditure in this case). We therefore did not conduct this test. 
 
A look at the consumption threshold levels revealed that child work in household non-market 
productive activities had a lower threshold than that for child work in market activities. This 
result may suggest that the influence of poverty may be greater in child work in market 
activities than it does on child work in non-market activities. In other words, it takes a higher 
consumption level to reduce child work in market activities than it does in non-market 
activities. As we did above, we also assessed the impact of land and consumption expenditure 
for households above and below the consumption threshold level. The estimation results are 
presented in Table 7. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
 
The results show that consumption level significantly reduced the probability that children 
would work in household non-market production activities among high consumption 
households but not among the low consumption households. However, increase in land-
holding size was found to significantly increase the probability that children would work 
when in non-market household production activities. These results were similar to those for 
all activities as presented above. However, the results on child work in market activities 
showed slightly different results where consumption level reduced the probability that 
children from households with both high and low consumption levels would work in market 
activities while land-holding size only increased the probability that children from low 
consumption households would work in market activities. These results may imply that child 
work in non-market activities was mainly due to consumption poverty while child work in 
non-market household production activities may have been due to both asset poverty and 
consumption poverty. 
 
6 Conclusions  
This study was conducted to assess the relationship between child work decisions and 
household income and asset poverty using of the rural sub-sample of the 2004 Malawi 
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Integrated Household Survey. The descriptive statistics showed that children in rural Malawi 
work in different activities with more time spent in domestic work and household non-market 
productive activities.  
 
Using instrumental variable probit models and controlling for child, household and 
community characteristics, the study re-affirmed the presence of a positive relationship 
between child labour and income poverty thereby accepting the hypothesis that child work in 
developing countries is largely due to poverty. Furthermore, the study also showed that 
increase in household wealth in the form of land-holding size increases the likelihood that 
children will work only among income poor households and when labour markets are 
imperfect. No significant relationship was found between land-holding size and child work 
decisions among income non-poor households suggesting that the probability that a child will 
work is inelastic to land-holding size for income non-poor households. These results support 
the Basu et al. (forthcoming) hypothesis that the increase in land-holding size provides 
working opportunities for children from income poor households. In addition, the study 
showed that the impact of household consumption expenditure on child labour is independent 
of household wealth. 
 
Earlier studies (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Beegle et al., 2006; Dumas, 2007) found that a 
positive relationship between household wealth in the form of land-holding size and child 
labour exists without qualifying the conditions under which household wealth and child work 
relate. This finding made household wealth to be looked at as the cause of child labour?. 
However, this study has shown that consumption poverty is the main cause of child work and 
that when the inability of the labour market to provide jobs when the child labour needs 
emerges in the household, land availability generates the work opportunities. These results do 
not discourage policies that encourage asset accumulation as a means of reducing poverty but 
they rather show that policies that increase the returns on these assets may be more effective 
since income poverty has been re-affirmed as the main cause of child labour. In addition, the 
findings in this study show that poverty reduction policies that increase the labour demands 
on the household such as public work programmes and promotion of small businesses may 
have adverse effects on child labour among poor households. 
 
Notes 
1. A case of perfect market is presented in Basu et al (2010). 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
PCE  Per capita consumption expenditure in MK 15,253.79 11,386.66 
Land Per capita land-holding in ha 0.48 1.35 
Child age Child age in years 9.17 2.84 
Child sex  1 = male; 0 = otherwise 0.50 0.50 
Own child 1= own child; 0= otherwise 0.76 0.43 
Adult male Number of male adults 1.42 1.05 
Female adults Number of female adults  1.54 0.85 
Infants Number of under five children 1.29 1.03 
Head age Age head in years 45.45 13.91 
Head sex 1 = male; 0 = otherwise 0.75 0.43 
No education 1 = head no formal education; 0 = otherwise 0.52 0.50 
Primary education 1 = head primary education; 0 =otherwise 0.10 0.30 
Secondary education 1 = head secondary education: 0 =otherwise 0.08 0.27 
Primary school  Distance to primary school in km 1.52 2.95 
School days Number of school days in the previous two weeks 7.42 3.70 
South 1 = Southern region: 0 = otherwise 0.42 0.49 
North  1 = Northern region: 0 = otherwise 0.16 0.37 
Season 1 = rainy season: 0 = otherwise 0.49 0.50 
N  7,108 
 
Table 2: Definition and descriptions of dependent variable 
Type of work 
Proportion of children that worked Hours of work 
Mean  Std. dev Mean Std. dev. 
All activities 0.54 0.50 7.89 12.06 
Domestic  0.43 0.49 4.80 8.59 
Non-market 0.26 0.44 2.42 5.97 
Market  0.07 0.25 0.67 3.74 
Observations 7,108 7,108 
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Table 3:  Results of model selection test 
 Variable 
Tobit regression 
 
Probit regression 
 
Truncated regression 
 
coef t-statistic coef z-statistic coef z-statistic 
              
PCE  0.0002 1.33 0.0000 1.05 0.0006 1.06 
PCE x Land 
-0.0002 -2.01** 0.0000 -1.97* -0.0003 -0.75 
Land 3.2618 1.96* 0.2866 1.93* 4.8886 0.72 
Child age 6.9812 11.30*** 0.4853 10.68*** 18.5497 5.20*** 
Chid age sqd 
-0.1916 -6.07*** -0.0145 -6.08*** -0.5390 -3.34*** 
Child sex  
-7.3551 -16.86*** -0.4783 -14.58*** -15.9156 -7.47*** 
Own child 
-0.2681 -0.46 0.0412 0.94 -4.0393 -1.77* 
Adult male 
-0.7567 -3.06*** -0.0603 -3.22*** -0.9248 -0.93 
Female adults 
-1.4615 -5.12*** -0.0623 -2.90*** -5.2361 -4.19*** 
Infants 0.8531 2.76** 0.0422 1.81* 2.9624 2.32** 
Head age 0.0691 3.10*** 0.0054 3.21*** 0.1017 1.14 
Head sex 
-1.6278 -2.59** -0.0811 -1.70* -5.1371 -2.04** 
No education 1.1413 2.45** 0.0657 1.86* 2.7363 1.45 
Secondary education 
-0.9755 -0.76 0.0190 0.20 -9.5199 -1.72* 
Primary school  0.1830 2.39** -0.0015 -0.27 1.1487 4.05*** 
School days 
-0.5582 -9.27*** -0.0350 -7.51*** -1.2208 -4.97*** 
South 0.9443 2.03** 0.0564 1.61 2.0821 1.09 
North  
-2.4660 -3.35*** -0.0822 -1.47 -11.2735 -3.50*** 
Season 
-2.9682 -4.26** -0.2627 -5.01*** -1.5488 -0.55 
Residual1 -0.0001 -0.77 0.0000 -0.73 -0.0003 -0.59 
Residual2 0.0002 1.77* 0.0000 1.76* 0.0003 0.68 
Constant  -39.5892 -8.69*** -2.6821 -7.93*** -143.6483 -5.59*** 
              
Sigma 16.12       25.70   
       
Log likelihood -18117.51  -4003.86  -13913.63  
LR Chi2 2214.68***  1861.46***    
Wald Chi2     156.20***  
Pseudo R2 0.06  0.18    
N 7108  7108  3869  
Likelihood ratio 
statistic 
400.02*** 
 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and * denotes significance at 10%. 
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Table 4: Regression results of the ivprobit estimation for all child work 
Variables Coefficient. Marginal effects z- statistic 
PCE  0.0000 0.0000 1.04 
PCE x Land 0.0000 0.0000 -1.96* 
Land 0.2866 0.2866 1.91* 
Child age 0.4853 0.4853 10.58*** 
Chid age sqd -0.0145 -0.0145 -6.02*** 
Child sex  -0.4783 -0.4783 -14.44*** 
Own child 0.0412 0.0412 0.93 
Adult male -0.0603 -0.0603 -3.19*** 
Female adults -0.0623 -0.0623 -2.87*** 
Infants 0.0422 0.0422 1.79* 
Head age 0.0054 0.0054 3.17*** 
Head sex -0.0811 -0.0811 -1.68 
No education 0.0657 0.0657 1.85* 
Secondary education 0.0190 0.0190 0.20 
Primary school  -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.26 
School days -0.0350 -0.0350 -7.44*** 
North -0.0822 -0.0822 -1.46 
South  -0.2627 -0.2627 -4.96*** 
Season 0.0564 0.0564 1.59 
Constant  -2.6821 -2.6821 -7.85*** 
Wald Chi2  1,504.71***  
N  7,108  
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
 
Table 5: Effects of land below and above the threshold consumption 
Variable 
  
High consumption Low consumption 
Marginal effects z-statistics Marginal effects z-statistics 
PCE -0.00 -1.94* 0.00 1.43 
Land  -0.04 -0.99 0.10 2.42** 
Wald Chi2  280.23***  1,161.55*** 
N   1,977   5,131 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
 
 27
 
Table 6:  IVprobit estimation results for child work in non-market and market activities 
  Non-market production activities Market activities 
 Coefficient. 
Marginal 
effects z- statistic Coefficient. 
Marginal 
effects z- statistic 
PCE 0.0000 0.0000 0.29 -0.0001 -0.0001 -3.60*** 
PCE x Land  0.0000 0.0000 -3.18*** 0.0000 0.0000 -1.25 
Land  0.5205 0.5205 3.29*** 0.3151 0.3151 1.41 
Threshold PCE  18554.88   19766.49  
N   7108     7108   
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
 
Table 7: Effects of land and consumption below and above the threshold consumption on child work in market and 
non-market activities 
Variable 
High consumption Low consumption 
Marginal effects z-statistics Marginal effects z-statistics 
 Non-market production activities 
PCE -0.0001 -1.93* 0.0000 0.01 
Land  0.0453 0.80 0.0514 2.59** 
 Market activities 
PCE -0.0003 -1.87* -0.0002 -3.46*** 
Land  0.1622 1.08 0.0444 1.80* 
Note: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
 
